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NOTES
The Constitutionality of State Residency Requirements
for Admission to the Bar
State residency requirements for admission to the bar' can be
classified into two basic types. The first, the durational residency
requirement, demands that the applicant reside in the state during
a set period of time.2 The second, the simple residency requirement,
demands only that the applicant establish residence by a specific
date-for example, the day of application or admission to the bar.
3
1. As a general rule, the power to admit attorneys and set admissions standards is
vested in the judiciary. See, e.g., Spevack v. Klein, 885 U.S. 511, 524-25 (1966) (Harlan,
J., dissenting); Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 879 (1866); Sams v. Olah, 225
Ga. 497, 501-03, 169 S.E.2d 790, 796-97, cert. denied, 897 U.S. 914 (1969); Opinion
of the Justices to the Senate, 289 Mass. 607, 194 N.E. 813 (1935). See generally Lee, The
Constitutional Power of the Courts over Admission to the Bar, 13 HARv. L. REv. 23
(1899); Comment, Admission to the Bar and Separation of Powers, 7 UTAH L. REv. 82
(1960). Cf. Comment, State Court Assertion of Power To Determine and Demand Its
Own Budget, 120 U. PA. L. Ray. 1187 (1972).
Bar admission standards appear in many forms. They may be court rules, see, e.g.,
ILL. S. Cr. R. 701-09, or rules of a board of bar examiners whose power is delegated
by the state court, see, e.g., Florida Board of Bar Examiners, Rules and Regulations,
Oct. 15, 1970. If the admissions standards appear in the form of state statutes, they
are generally formulated only as an aid to the state court and the final decision as to
the acceptability of the standards still rests with the court. See, e.g., In re Park, 484
P.2d 690, 691 (Alas. 1971). Although operationally delegated to another body, the
formulation of admissions standards is a judicial function, the authority and final
responsibility resting with the court. See Dowling, The Inherent Power of the Judi-
ciary, 21 A.B.A.J. 635, 638 (1935).
2. The different types of durational residency requirements include:
a. Residence prior to application. See, e.g., MONT. S. Or. R. 25(A)(1) (six months);
Wyo. S. Cr. R. 21(c) (six months).
b. Residence prior to bar examination. See, e.g., Asuz. S. Or. R. 28(c)(IV)2 (three
months prior to first day of examination); Nay. S. Or. R. 51(8) (six months).
c. Residence prior to admission. See, e.g., N.Y. CT. ApP. R. 520.2 (six months); VT.
S. Cr. (PT. II) R. 1, § 1 (six months). See generally SECTION OF LEGAL EDUCATION AND
ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, LAw SCHOOLS AND BAR ADMISSION
REQUIREMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES (1968) [hereinafter ABA, ADMISSION REQUIREMENTS];
RULES FOR ADMISSION TO THE BAR (West Publishing Co. 1972) [hereinafter BAR RULi..
The word "residence" has no uniform meaning with respect to bar admissions
among the different states. See Reese & Green, That Elusive Word, "Residence", 6
VAND. L. REv. 561, 568 (1958). A rule requiring that an applicant be a "resident" of a
state for a set number of months before admission may require only domicile or it
may require as much as actual presence in the state for seventy-five per cent of the
six-month period. Compare, e.g., In re Stevens, 855 P.2d 164 (Alas. 1960), interpreting
what is now ALASKA STAT. § 08.08.180 (1968), with ARIz. S. Cr. R. 28(c)(IV).
8. See, e.g., Board of Commrs., Alabama State Bar, Rules Governing Admission to the
Bar of Alabama, Rule IV, Oct. 3, 1969 (date of application); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-11-03
(1964) (date of admission).
Some states have no residency requirements at all. See, e.g., Comm. on Admissions
and Grievances, U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, Information for Ap-
plicants for District of Columbia Bar Examination, March 1970; ILL. S. Or. R. 701-09;
Articles of Incorporation of the Louisiana State Bar Assn., art. 12. Some states require
an intention to become a resident. See, e.g., CONN. SUPER. CT. R. (ADMISSION TO THE
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Because state statutes generally make it illegal to practice law with-
out a license,4 these requirements affect persons in several different
situations. In order to practice in most states a graduating law stu-
dent must fulfill a residency requirement. An attorney who is ad-
mitted to practice in one state but who desires to practice in another
must often give up his old practice and residence in order to meet
the residency requirement of the new state.5 An attorney who desires
to appear periodically or in isolated cases in a state in which he is
not licensed will often be required to appear with associated in-
state counsel.6
There has been controversy in the lower federal courts con-
cerning durational residency requirements7 and one recent state court
challenge of a simple residency requirement.8 This Note will discuss
the constitutional validity of these requirements in the face of equal
protection attacks, concentrating on the extent to which such require-
ments are justified by the interests of state courts in maintaining the
integrity of their legal systems.
BAR) § 8 (for those who have practiced in another state, there is a six-month durational-
residency requirement, id. § 13). A last group of states requires an intent to practice in
the state. See, e.g., Arkansas State Board of Law Examiners, Arkansas Bar Examina-
tions-Requirements and Information, May 15, 1972; Michigan State Board of Law
Examiners, Rules Governing Admission to the Bar, Rule 1, 1965. See generally ABA,
ADmssoN REqunuREms, supra note 2; BAR RULEs, supra note 2.
4. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6126 (West 1962); MASS. GEN. lAws. ANN. ch.
221, § 41 (1955); N.J. Rav. STAT. § 2A:170-78 (1971); N.Y. JUDICiARY LAw §§ 478, 485
(McKinney 1968). See generally Note, Remedies Available To Combat the Unauthorized
Practice of Law, 62 COLUM. L. REv. 501 (1962).
5. See, e.g., In re Titus, - Va. -, 191 S.E.2d 798 (1972); In re Tang, 39 App. Div.
2d 357, 333 N.Y.S.2d 964 (1972). Cf. Martin v. Davis, 187 Kan. 472, 357 P.2d 782 (1960),
appeal dismissed per curiam sub nom. Martin v. Walton, 368 U.S. 25 (1961). As a
result, it is often impossible to be a member of two state bars. See, e.g., Virgin Islands
Bar Assn. v. Dench, 124 F. Supp. 257 (D.V.I. 1953), appeal dismissed, 215 F.2d 810 (3d
Cir. 1954).
6. See generally A. KATz, ADmSSION OF NoNREsmENT ATORNEYS PRO HAc VICE (Re-
search Contribution of the American Bar Foundation, No. 5, 1968).
7. Compare Keenan v. Board of Law Examiners, 317 F. Supp. 1350 (E.D.N.C. 1970),
noted in 40 FormAim L. REv. 167 (1971) (twelve-month pre-examination residency
requirement unconstitutional), with Suffling v. Bondurant, 339 F. Supp. 257 (D.N.M.
1972), affd. mem. sub nom. Rose v. Bondurant, 41 U.S.L.W. 3287 (U.S., Nov. 21, 1972)
(six-month preadmission residency requirement upheld). For other decisions overturning
durational residency requirements, see Smith v. Davis, 350 F. Supp. 1225 (S.D. W. Va.
1972) (twelve months prior to admission); Potts v. Honorable Justices of the Supreme
Court, 332 F. Supp. 1392 (D. Hawaii 1971) (six months continuous residence any time
after age fifteen, plus status as a registered voter prior to bar examination); Lipman v.
Van Zant, 329 F. Supp. 391 (N.D. Miss. 1971) (twelve months prior to application),
noted in 6 SurroLx LJ. 565 (1972); Webster v. Wofford, 321 F. Supp. 1259 (N.D. Ga.
1970) (twelve months prior to admission). Cf. Mercer v. Hemmings, 194 S.2d 579 (Fla.
1967) (two-year residency requirement for accountants unconstitutional).
8. In re Titus, - Va. -, 191 S.E.2d 812 (1972) (simple residency requirement up-




The states have the power to administer their own court systems.9
More specifically, it is settled that "[a]dmission to practice in a
State and before its courts necessarily belongs to that State."'10 That
there are some limitations upon state control over its bar, how-
ever, has been demonstrated by a long history of judicial deci-
sions. First, the state's purpose must be a legitimate one; the admis-
sion standards are to be for the protection of the state's citizens and
not for the selfish interests of its bar.1 A second limitation is that
the bar admission standards must not deprive persons of rights
guaranteed by the Constitution.12
The first limitation presents no serious difficulty in regard to
residency requirements. Despite some naked assertions to the con-
trary,1 3 these requirements no doubt are formulated to protect the
9. The two judicial systems of courts, the state judicatures and the federal judi-
ciary, have autonomous control over the conduct of their officers, among whom,
in the present context, lawyers are included. The court's control over a lawyer's
professional life derives from his relation to the responsibilities of a court.
Theard v. United States, 354 U.S. 278, 281 (1957).
10. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 248 (1956) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring). Cf. Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347 U.S. 442 (1954) (doctors).
11. See, e.g., In re Keenan, 314 Mass. 544, 547, 50 N.E.2d 785, 787 (1943); People v.
Alfani, 227 N.Y. 334, 339, 125 N.E. 671, 673 (1919). Cf. United States v. American Medi-
cal Assn., 130 F.2d 233 (D.C. Cir. 1942), afid., 317 U.S. 519 (1943) (doctors);
State v. Pennoyer, 65 N.H. 113, 18 A. 878 (1889) (doctors). The requirement of a
legitimate state purpose is now subsumed under the traditional equal protection
standard. See, e.g., McDonald v. Board of Election Commrs., 394 U.S. 802, 809 (1968).
Cf. note 37 infra and accompanying text. It appears to have replaced the older police
power phrase "to protect the public." See, e.g., People v. Alfani, 227 N.Y. 334, 339,
125 N.E. 671, 673 (1919). Oriented specifically to bar admissions, either phrase requires
that qualifications relate to an "applicant's fitness or capacity to practice law." Schware
v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 239 (1956). For a recent case that appears to
be decided in the older police power terms, see Mercer v. Hemmings, 194 S.2d 579
(Fla. 1966).
12. See, e.g., Baird v. State Bar, 401 U.S. 1 (1970) (denial of admission for refusal
to answer questions concerning political beliefs and associations that were designed
to lay a foundation for barring admission); Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353
U.S. 232 (1956) (denial of admission for "bad moral character" demonstrated by
constitutionally protected activity); Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866) (re-
quired oath that attorney had not borne arms against Union in Civil War). See also
Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (196), overruling Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117 (1960)
(denial of right against self-incrimination at disbarment proceeding); Willner v. Com-
mittee on Character, 373 U.S. 96 (1962) (denial of right to confront and examine ac-
cusers at disbarment proceeding).
13. Although bar residency requirements are often attacked as trade barriers, critics
rely on neither legislative history nor statistics to prove their point. See, e.g., Dalton &
'Williamson, State Barriers Against Migrant Lawyers, 25 U. KAN. Crry L. R v. 144
(1957); Horack, "Trade Barriers" to Bar Admission, 28 J. Am. JuD. Soc. 102 (1944).
Durational residency requirements will initially have some effect on the market condi-
tions within the state. But it is probable that the resulting decrease in the number
of lawyers within the state would drive legal fees up. As the fees increase, more lawyers
would be willing to meet the residency requirement, minimizing any trade barrier




state's citizenry.1 4 The question, therefore, is whether the state's
interests are sufficient to fortify the requirements against constitu-
tional attack.
Because the equal protection challenges to bar residency re-
quirements have generally arisen in the federal courts,' 5 it should be
noted that the federal courts may owe some deference to state court
systems. As Justice Harlan once noted, bar admission practices
involve "an area of federal-state relations . . . into which [federal
courts] should be especially reluctant and slow to enter."''0 A practical
justification for this view is that the complicated problems of the
bar are best dealt with by the courts who work directly with the
attorneys. This principle of local control, a part of English legal
institutions,17 was transplanted to the colonies8 and is still recog-
nized today to be necessary for the effective administration of the
bar.'9
It could be argued that any deference due state bar admissions
standards should apply only when dealing with nonconstitutional
problems; federal courts should exercise a demanding standard when
reviewing all state laws that infringe on fundamental constitutional
rights.20 But in several cases dealing with first amendment challenges
to bar practices it appears that the Supreme Court has allowed incur-
sions into constitutionally protected areas that might have been dis-
allowed in circumstances not so closely concerned with the integrity
of the state's legal process itself.21 For example, a state has been per-
mitted to deny admission to the bar to an applicant for failure to
answer questions concerning membership in the Communist Party
14. See notes 69-80 infra and accompanying text.
15. See cases cited in note 5 supra. The suit in In re Titus, - Va. -, 191 S.E.2d
798 (1972), had previously come before a three-judge federal district court, which
abstained. See - Va. at -, 191 S.E.2d at 799.
16. Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252, 276 (1957) (dissenting opinion). See also
Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 248 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., con-
curring).
17. See 2 W. HoLswoRTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 311-19, 493-505 (4th ed.
1936); 6 id. at 434-43 (2d ed. 1937); C. WARREN, A HsroRy OF THE AmmucAN BAR 26
(1911). See generally H. COHEN, A HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH BAR (1929).
18. See C. WARREN, supra note 17, at 39-143; Lee, supra note 1, at 245.
19. See, e.g., Theard v. United States, 354 U.S. 278, 281 (1957); Webster v. Wofford,
321 F. Supp. 1259, 1262 (N.D. Ga. 1970); CoMMnEr ON FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONSmPS
AS AFFECTED BY JUDICIAL DEcIsIONs, CONFERFNCE OF CHIEF JUSTICES, REPORT 15 (1958).
Cf. Baird v. Arizona, 401 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1971) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Konigsberg v.
State Bar, 353 U.S. 252, 311-12 (1957) (Harlan, J., dissenting); In re Integration of
Nebraska State Bar Assn., 133 Neb. 283, 289-90, 275 N.W. 265, 268 (1957).
20. See Law Students Civil Rights Research Council v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154,
184-85 (1971) (Black, J., dissenting).
21. The Court's decisions dealing with first amendment rights and admission to
the bar are, however, difficult to reconcile with one another. See Baird v. State Bar,
401 U.S. 1, 2-4 (1971) (Black, J.).
Notes
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because the failure obstructed legitimate inquiry.22 The Court has
affirmed a proper examination into an applicant's political beliefs
when used to ensure the sincerity of the applicant in taking his
oath.23 Lawyers may also be required to support a professional or-
ganization, despite disagreement with its public position or policies,
because of the greater benefit to the profession and to society that
would result from a unified bar.24 Although in all of these situations
there were infringements upon the constitutionally protected rights
of freedom of speech and association, the Court deferred both to the
judgment and vital interests of the state courts.
The Court, however, has held that the first amendment protects
the right of organizations to supply group legal services to their mem-
bers. 25 The state statutes involved prohibited this practice because
it constituted fomenting and soliciting legal business.2 In each
of these cases the Court found that the state was unable to show that
the state law furthered any "appreciable public interest," specifically,
"the State's interest in high standards of legal ethics."27 While these
cases indicate that certain bar practices will be curtailed, the Court
appeared willing to balance the interest of the state with the consti-
tutional interest of the individual.
More directly in point, in two rather cryptic decisions the Su-
22. Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 55 (1961); In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82, 95
(1961). Compare, e.g., In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. at 89-90, with Gibson v. Florida Legis-
lative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 555-57 (1963) (requiring a foundation for
inquiry to be laid before allowing investigation into constitutionally protected member-
ship lists). The Court in Konigsberg found legitimate the state's concern with the loyalty
of "'a limited class of persons in or aspiring to public positions by virtue of which
they could, if evilly motivated, create serious dangers to the public safety."' 366 US.
at 54, quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 527 (1958). Speiser was distinguished
by the Court on the ground that a state interest in protecting the citizenry, and
not merely an attempt to penalize beliefs, was involved in Konigsberg. 366 U.S. at 53-
56.
23. Compare Law Students Civil Rights Research Council v. Wadmond, 401 U.S.
154 (1971), and In re Summers, 325 U.S. 561 (1945), with Bond v. Floyd, 385 US. 116
(1966) (examination into sincerity of prospective legislator's oath of office found constitu-
tionally impermissible), and Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966) (requirement for
state employees to take oath supporting Constitution found unconstitutional). Also
compare the breadth of the bar application question allowed in Law Students, de-
manding disclosure of knowing membership in the Communist Party, a protected
activity under the first amendment, with United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967).
See also Brandenberg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
24. Lathrop v. Donahue, 367 US. 820, 843-45 (1961). Justice Harlan, concurring in
the judgment, stated that "it can hardly be doubted that it was Constitutionally per-
missible for [the state] to regard the functions of an Integrated Bar as sufficiently
important to justify whatever incursions on these individual freedoms may be thought
to arise .... " 367 U.S. at 861.
25. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v.
Virginia State Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964); United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar, 389
U.S. 217 (1967).
26. See 371 U.S. at 423-26; 377 US. at 6; 389 U.S. at 218, 225.
27. 371 U.S. at 444; 377 U.S. at 8; 389 U.S. at 255.
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preme Court has deferred to state bar admissions practices in regard
to residency requirements. Martin v. Walton28 appears to have in-
directly approved simple residency requirements and Suffling v.
Bondurant29 upheld a six month durational residency requirement.
In Martin v. Walton the appellant was a lawyer with practices
and offices in both Kansas and Missouri. Kansas law required any
attorney practicing in another state, even if a member of the Kansas
bar, to appear with a local attorney when appearing in Kansas courts.
The Kansas supreme court upheld the statute against an equal
protection challenge. 0 The United States Supreme Court, per
curiam, dismissed the appeal for want of a substantial federal ques-
tion, noting inter alia: "'We cannot disregard the reasons given by
the Kansas Supreme Court for the Rules in question." 31 The Kansas
supreme court had stressed that the rules were designed "to provide
litigants in [Kansas] tribunals with the service of a resident attorney
familiar with local rules, procedure and practice and upon whom
service may be had in all matters connected with actions or pro-
ceedings proper to be served upon an attorney of record."32 The
considerations behind the Kansas practice mirror those behind
simple residency requirements. In fact, the Virginia supreme court,
relying on the same justifications that were commended by the Court
in Martin, recently upheld a simple residency requirement for bar
admissions in the face of due process and equal protection attacks.83
The basic premise behind both the Kansas practice and simple resi-
dency requirements is that there are definite advantages in having
a bar composed of local attorneys-local in the sense that they live
or work, or both, in the state.
A six-month durational residency requirement was challenged in
Suffling v. Bondurant. A three-judge district court found that the
New Mexico bar rules, which required six months of residence prior
to admission, were acceptable under the traditional equal protection
28. 368 U.S. 25 (1961), affg. Martin v. Davis, 187 Kan. 473, 357 P.2d 782 (1960).
29. 339 F. Supp. 257 (D.N.M. 1972), affd. mem. sub nom. Rose v. Bondurant, 41
U.S.L.W. 3287 (U.S., Nov. 21, 1972).
30. 187 Kan. at 484-85, 357 P.2d at 791-92.
31. 368 U.S. at 26.
32. 187 Kan. 472, 485, 357 P.2d 782, 791 (1960). The specific objections were:
Kansas courts and commissions encountered difficulty in procuring the presence
of the Kansas licensed attorneys officed in Missouri at the call of the court's and
the commission's dockets; in the inability of Kansas officed attorneys to procure
service on Missouri officed Kansas attorneys without having to proceed to another
state; in the failure of some Kansas licensed attorneys officed in Missouri to
answer calls to appear on matters of urgency; and in the failure of those attorneys
to familiarize themselves with the rules of local practice and procedure by reason
of their infrequent appearance before the courts and tribunals.
187 Kan. at 482-83, 357 P.2d at 790.
33. In re Titus, - Va. -, -, 191 S.E.2d 798, 802 (1972). The court also upheld a
full-time practice requirement on the authority of Martin in In re Brown, - Va. -
191 S.E.2d 812 (1972).
Notes
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test. The state used the time period to investigate the applicant's
background.3 4 The Supreme Court's affirmance was without opin-
ion. 5
It is possible to view Martin and Suffling as decisions on the
merits, foreclosing any further questions concerning simple residency
and six-month durational residency requirements.36 But because
Martin at best only indirectly approves simple residency require-
ments and because the precedential value of the Suffling affirmance
without opinion is uncertain, the constitutional dimensions should
be examined.
Under the traditional equal protection standard, a state retains
discretion to classify people (in this case into groups according to
residency status) so long as the classification bears a rational relation-
ship to a legitimate state purpose.3 7 The state is not required to
classify people with "mathematical precision,"33 and classifications
made by the state bear a presumption of validity. 9 This deference
to state wisdom 40 allows classifications to stand unless they are
34. 339 F. Supp. at 259.
35. 41 U.S.L.W. at 3287.
36. A dismissal "for want of a substantial federal question," in effect equivalent to
a summary affirmance, is technically a decision on the merits. In Barton v. Sentner, 353
US. 963 (1957), a summary affirmance of an appeal on the authority of United States v.
Witkovich, 353 U.S. 194 (1957), two justices dissented: "The Court, by summary affirm-
ance of this appeal, without argument, enlarges its holding in Withovich and strikes
down two more clauses of § 242(d)." 353 U.S. at 963 (Burton & Clark, JJ.). See R.
STERN & E. GRESSMAN, SuPREME CouRT PRACaCaE 197 (4th ed. 1969). But for various
reasons the Court has little difficulty in deciding a case contrary to previous recent
affirmances. See, e.g., Walz v. Tax Commr., 397 U.S. 664 (1967), which was decided on
the merits despite two prior dismissals for want of a substantial federal question of
cases raising the same issue: General Fin. Corp. v. Archetto, 369 U.S. 423 (1962); Heisy v.
County of Alameda, 352 U.S. 921 (1956). See generally Comment, The Significance of
Dismissals "For Want of a Substantial Federal Question": Original Sin in the Federal
Courts, 68 COLUM. L. Rav. 785 (1968). For lower courts, a recent dismissal or affirmance
should be dispositive. See, e.g., Two Guys from Harrison-Allentown, Inc. v. McGinley,
179 F. Supp. 944 (E.D. Pa. 1959), revd. on other grounds, 366 U.S. 582 (1961); Ahern v.
Murphy, 457 F.2d 363 (7th Cir. 1972). But see Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 615-17,
487 P.2d 1241, 1263-65, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 629-25 (1971).
37. E.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425 (1961); Williamson v. Lee Optical
Co., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955). This standard was found specifically applicable to bar
admissions requirements in Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 238-39
(1956). The requirement of a rational relationship is similar to the police power
limitation. Exercises of the police power must "fairly tend to accomplish the purpose of
[their] enactment, and must not go beyond the reasonable demands of the occasion." 2
T. CooLty, CoNsrrruTONAL LIMITATIONS 1231 (8th ed. 1927). Cf. note 11 supra and
accompanying text. The police power formulation had historically been applied to
regulation of the professions. See, e.g., Douglas v. Noble, 261 U.S. 165 (1932) (dentists);
Graves v. Minnesota, 272 U.S. 425 (1926) (dentists); Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S.
114, 122 (1888) (doctors).
38. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970). Accord, e.g., Goesaert v. Cleary,
335 U.S. 464, 466 (1948).
39. Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78-80 (1911).
40. The standard grew out of a deference to state legislative wisdom, see Tussman &
tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAIrr. L. Rav. 341, 343-44 (1949), but
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arbitrary or capricious.4' Under this traditional standard state legisla-
tion has appeared virtually immune from attack.
42
However, doubt has been cast upon the permissiveness of this
standard by recent Court decisions striking down legislation while
voicing the traditional test.43 There may be emerging a more de-
manding "traditional" test that could be couched in terms of re-
quiring a "fair and substantial relationship" between means and
purpose.44 But it is too early to gauge the import of these decisions,
and the application of a more rigorous traditional test to bar admis-
sion requirements is uncertain.
When dealing with either infringements upon fundamental
rights45 or with suspect classifications 6 the Court uses a wholly
different standard of review, one that imposes an almost Herculean
task upon the state. The classification must be precisely tailored so as
to accomplish the state's purpose,47 less drastic means must not be
available to accomplish its objective,48 and ultimately the interest
furthered must be a compelling one.49
The initial question is which standard of review applies to bar
the Supreme Court has applied the same standard to state courts in bar admissions
cases. See, e.g., Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 238-39 (1956).
41. See, e.g., Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948); Railway Express Agency, Inc. v.
New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949).
42. Classifications are generally overturned only when "no grounds can be con-
ceived to justify them." McDonald v. Board of Election Commrs., 394 U.S. 802, 809
(1969).
43. E.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
See Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreward: In Search of Evolving Doc-
trine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REv.
1, 18-20 (1972), and cases cited therein. See also Rosario v. Rockefeller, 41 U.S.L.W.
4401 (U.S., March 21, 1973). Although the Court upheld a state voter registration
requirement, it talked in terms of an "important state goal" and a "particularized
legitimate purpose." 41 U.S.L.W. at 4404.
44. F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 US. 412, 415 (1920). Chief Justice
Burger used this phrase in Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971). The Second Circuit
picked up the term in Green v. Waterford Bd. of Educ., 41 U.S.L.W. 2419 (U.S., Feb.
13, 1973) (Feinberg, J.). See also Booras v. Belle Terre, No. 72-2040, slip op. at 2008
(2d Cir., Feb. 27, 1973) (Mansfield, J.): "Under this approach the test for application of
the Equal Protection Clause is whether the legislative classification is in fact sub-
stantially related to the object of the statute" (emphasis original).
45. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 41 U.S.L.W. 4213 (U.S., Jan. 22, 1973) (right of per-
sonal privacy); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (right to vote
in state elections); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 745 (1965) (right to travel);
Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (right to procreate).
46. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964) (race); Oyama v. California,
332 U.S. 633 (1947) (ancestry); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (alienage).
47. E.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 351, 357-58 (1972); Kramer v. Union Free
School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 632 (1970).
48. E.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S.
398, 407 (1963).
49. E.g., Roe v. Wade, 41 U.S.L.W. 4213, 4228 (U.S., Jan. 22, 1973); Dunn v.
Blumstein 405 U.S. 330, 343-44 (1972).
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residency requirements. Because the right to travel is an established
fundamental right, 0 it is protected by the strict equal protection
standard. 1 Clearly, penalization of travel may abridge that right as
does deterrence or prohibition. 52 But the Court in Shapiro v.
Thompson,53 while invalidating a one-year residency requirement
for state welfare benefits, was careful to avoid comment on whether
bar residency requirements "penalized" the right of travel.u
The Court's travel cases may indicate the extent of the penaliza-
tion necessary to constitute a denial of the right to travel. Edwards v.
California5 and United States v. Guest56 dealt with actions that
prohibited interstate movement. In Dunn v. Blumstein57 the penali-
zation was denial of the fundamental right to vote. In Shapiro wel-
fare benefits were denied to indigents. People cannot live where
they cannot eat, and such a denial of benefits would either effectively
bar entry into the state or force them to live without food and
shelter. In all these cases there is either deterrence, prohibition, or
a substantial penalization.
All state bar admissions requirements will, to some degree, either
penalize or deter an applicant's move into a new state. 8 Examples
50. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 335 (1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618, 633-38 (1968); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757-60 (1966); Edwards v.
California, 314 U.S. 160, 177 (1941); Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35, 43
(1867). See generally Z. CHArnE, THREE HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CoNsTIrTbON (1956).
51. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 335 (1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618, 634 (1968).
52. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 338-42 (1972).
53. 394 U.S. 618 (1968).
54. We imply no view of the validity of waiting-period or residence requirements
. . to obtain a license to practice a profession . . . . Such requirements may
promote compelling state interests on the one hand, or, on the other, may not
be penalties upon the constitutional right of interstate travel.
394 U.S. at 638 n.21 (emphasis original).
The right to seek employment in a new state is integrally related to the right of
interstate travel. See Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 163, 181 (1941); Truax v.
Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 41 (1915); Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551-52 (No. 3230)
(C.C.E.D. Pa. 1825). Cf. Smith v. Texas, 233 U.S. 630 (1914). Employment also in-
cludes professional pursuits. Although at one time it was thought that the practice of
law was a privilege that could be granted or withheld by the state, see Bradwell v.
Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 139 (1872); In re Cate, 273 P. 617, 619 (Cal. App.
1928); In re Cloud, 217 Iowa 3, 10, 250 N.W. 160, 163 (1933), the argument no longer
has any force, see, e.g., Baird v. State Bar, 401 U.S. 1, 8 (1971); Schware v. Board of
Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 238-39 (1956); Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 362
(1969), overruling Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1 (1944). But cf. Baird v. Arizona, 401
U.S. 1, 19-20 (1971) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
55. 314 U.S. 160 (1941) (statute designed to prevent nonresident indigents from
entering the state).
56. 383 U.S. 745 (1965) (conspiracy to prevent use of highways by violence and
intimidation).
57. 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
58. The possible scope of future constitutional attacks based on the right to travel
appeared to concern Chief Justice Warren, dissenting in Shapiro, when he warned:
The Court's decision reveals only the top of the iceberg. Lurking beneath are
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are a different education requirement,59 a more difficult bar examina-
tion,.0 a more exacting character investigation,61 a larger fee, 2 or a
different requirement for references in the new state.63 Even the
many definitions of the term "residence" will do the same. 6 But
impositions upon movement are spectral. Some requirements will
cause an individual only minor inconvenience while others will effec-
tively prohibit him from moving into a new state. The most minor,
such as requiring an individual to submit three rather than two
references for bar admission, are clearly not the kinds of penalization
that have concerned the Court. But a one-year durational residency
requirement for voting approaches the other end of the spectrum,
and a sufficient penalization to invoke the stricter standard is more
certain.
Recent cases reveal a judicial approach consistent with this
analysis. Martin v. Walton65 and lower court decisions upholding
simple residency requirements under the traditional equal protection
standard 6 indicate that these requirements are, indeed, only minor
the multitude of situations in which States have imposed residence requirements
including eligibility to vote, to engage in certain professions or occupations or to
attend a state-supported university. Although the Court takes pains to avoid
acknowledging the ramifications of its decision, its implications cannot be
ignored.
394 U.S. at 655.
59. Compare, e.g., GA. CoDE ANN. § 9-103(b)(i) (1966) (two years of undergraduate
college work), with CONN. SuPER. CT. R. (ADMISSION TO THE BAR) § 8 (either a bachelor's
or master's degree).
60. See, e.g., Admission to Bar by Examinations in 1969, 39 BAR EXAMINER 106-07
(1970).
61. Until 1971, Pennsylvania's bar admission procedure included, among other
things, a nine-month clerkship for the purpose of monitoring the moral fitness of
the applicant. See Pennsylvania State Board of Law Examiners, Circular of In-
formation, Nov. 1, 1966, at 25-30. See also King, Character Investigations in Virginia
and Neighboring States, 34 BAR EXAMINER 112, 114 (1965).
62. Compare, e.g., Articles of Incorporation of the Louisiana State Bar Assn., art.
XIV, § 7(A) (1972) ($35.00 fee), with Florida Board of Bar Examiners, Rules and Regu-
lations, Rule 5, § 51, Oct. 15, 1970 ($400.00 fee from applicants admitted to another bar
in the past twelve months).
63. See, e.g., King, supra note 61, at 114.
64. Compare, e.g., In re Tang, 39 App. Div. 2d 357, 333 N.Y.S.2d 964 (1972), with
In re Stevens, 355 P.2d 164 (Alas. 1960).
65. 368 U.S. 25 (1961). See notes 30-32 supra and accompanying text.
66. Three-judge district courts approved simple residency requirements for bar
admissions in Smith v. Davis, 350 F. Supp. 1225, 1250 (S.D. W. Va. 1972) (dictum);
Lipman v. Van Zant, 329 F. Supp. 391, 402 (N.D. Miss. 1971); Keenan v. Board of
Law Examiners, 317 F. Supp. 1350, 1361 (E.D.N.C. 1970) (dictum). The Virginia
supreme court so held in In re Titus, - Va. -, -, 191 S.E.2d 798, 803 (1972). A
simple residency requirement was impliedly approved in Suffling v. Bondurant, 339
F. Supp. 257 (D.N.M. 1972), affd. mem. sub nom. Rose v. Bondurant, 41 U.S.L.W.
3287 (U.S., Nov. 21, 1972). See also Ahern v. Murphy, 457 F.2d 363 (7th Cir. 1972)
(city residency requirement for policemen upheld); Detroit Police Officers Assn. v. City
of Detroit, 385 Mich. 519, 190 N.W.2d 97 (1971), appeal dismissed, 405 U.S. 950 (1972)
(city residency requirement for policemen upheld).
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inconveniences and not the sufficient penalization necessary to invoke
the stricter standard of review.
Durational requirements present a more difficult problem of
determining when sufficient penalization of the right to travel occurs.
It would be difficult to describe a hypothetical one-day durational
residency requirement as a penalization but not difficult to classify
as such a three-year requirement.67 For an individual who has met
all admissions requirements save residence, temporary employment
for a short durational period should be no problem. In addition,
employers often hire waiting bar applicants to do substantially the
same work that the applicants will do after being licensed. The
problem is: at what discrete point is the penalization sufficient to
invoke strict scrutiny? Any line drawn must, out of necessity, be an
arbitrary one. The lower federal courts, in deciding the ultimate
issue of constitutionality, have consistently struck down twelve-
month durational residency requirements, while in Suffling v. Bon-
durant a six-month requirement was upheld.68 Perhaps these deci-
sions provide practical guidance for determining when to apply the
strict standard.
Assuming that the strict test does not apply, both simple resi-
dency and durational requirements bear up well under the tradi-
tional test. This analysis will first consider the justifications for
simple residency requirements. One justification is that a bar with a
local membership creates the professional and social pressures
necessary for the maintenance of discipline. 9 As a means of setting
67. But see Walker v. Yucht, 41 U.S.L.W. 2341 (D. Del., Dec. 6, 1972) (three-judge
court upholding three-year durational residency requirement for general assembly
members, explicitly refusing to apply strict scrutiny).
68. All the cases cited in note 7 supra as overturning durational residency require-
ments involved twelve-month periods except Potts v. Honorable Justices of the
Supreme Court, 332 F. Supp. 1392 (D. Hawaii 1971). In that case, the requirement was
for six months of residence any time after the age of fifteen, while a period specified
for character investigations and interviews did not require residence. The court found
the residency requirement "arbitrary and capricious," and did not reach the issue of
penalization of the right to travel. 332 F. Supp. at 1398. However, Smith v. Davis, 350
F. Supp. 1225, 1228 (S.D. W. Va. 1972), Lipman v. Van Zant, 329 F. Supp. 391, 403
(N.D. Miss. 1971), and Webster v. Wofford, 321 F. Supp. 1259, 1262 (N.D. Ga. 1970),
all expressly stated that shorter requirements would be permissible for the purpose of
character investigations and interviews. Suffling v. Bondurant, 339 F. Supp. 257
(D.N.M. 1972), affd. mem. sub nor. Rose v. Bondurant, 41 U.S.L.W. 3287 (U.S., Nov.
21, 1972), upheld a six-month requirement for this same purpose. The period ap-
proved in Suffling, though, was six months prior to admission. 339 F. Supp. at 260. A
requirement of six months of residence prior to application for the bar examination
may be a twelve-month requirement in sheep's clothing.
69. There has recently been much attention focused on the need for a disciplined
bar. See, e.g., R. CrAR & H. KALVEN, CoNTEM : TRANSCRIPT OF THE CoNTErPT
CITATIONS, SENTENCES, AND RESPONSES OF THE CHICAGO CONSPIRACY (1970); SPECIAL
CoMMITTEE ON EvALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, ABA, REPORT 8-9 (1971);
Burger, The Necessity for Civility, 52 F.R.D. 211 (1971) (remarks of the Chief Justice
at the opening session of the American Law Institute); Cole, Bar Discipline and
Spevack v. Klein, 53 A.B.A.J. 819 (1967); Wright, Self Discipline of the Bar: Theory or
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standards and of identifying and correcting unacceptable behavior,
local pressure and observation are invaluable and strike an accept-
able balance between the need for discipline and for a free-thinking
bar.70 Another justification for simple residency requirements is that
local lawyers will have a stake in the community. To the extent that
lawyers realize that their actions and activities will have an impact
on the administration of the legal system in their community, they
may be less inclined toward unprofessional and unethical conduct
and more inclined toward effecting high professional standards.7'
Third, local lawyers will have a knowledge of local customs and
procedures that recent law school graduates and out-of-state attorneys
will not have. Although knowledge of local intricacies is not expected
of the novitiate, it is part of the education of a seasoned lawyer and
is what the community properly expects. 72 Finally, many members of
Fact?, 57 A.B.A.J. 757 (1971). It is interesting to note that the British recognized as early
as the seventeenth century that local associations were necessary to maintain
effective control over the bar. 6 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 17, at 442-43.
The interest in a disciplined bar has been stressed repeatedly by the Supreme
Court. See, e.g., Theard v. United States, 354 U.S. 278, 281 (1957); Ex parte Burr, 22
U.S. (9 Wheat.) 529 (1824). A disciplined bar is needed because the legal profession
is entrusted with "the safekeeping of this country's legal and political institutions."
Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 52 (1961). This interest has asserted itself in
admissions standards dealing with moral and ethical considerations. See, e.g., Justice
Frankfurter, concurring in Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 247
(1957):
(AIIU the interests of man that are comprised under the constitutional guarantees
given to "life, liberty and property" are in the professional keeping of lawyers. It
is a fair characterization of the lawyer's responsibility in our society that he
stands "as a shield," . . . in defense of right and to ward off wrong. From a
profession charged with such responsibilities there must be exacted those qualities
of truth-speaking, of a high sense of honor, of granite discretion, of the strictest
observance of fiduciary responsibility, that have, throughout the centuries, been
compendiously described as "moral character."
It has also asserted itself in court control over lawyers through disbarment proceed-
ings. See generally Note, Procedures for Disciplining Attorneys in Virginia, 29 WAsH.
& LEE L. Rv. 439 (1972).
70. Pressure and observation with respect to those lawyers involved in litigation
comes from the courts, and is best done on a continuous basis. A transient bar, in and
out of courtrooms across the country, would not be subject to the same day-to-day
control as are local bars. An understanding of the bounds of permissible conduct re-
sults from experience and a continuous process of standard-setting by the local bench.
It should be noted that state residency requirements will not prohibit a non-
resident attorney from advising on federal rights and federal litigation. Where the
admitting courts are federal courts and the legal concerns are federal concerns, the
states no longer have an overriding interest. See, e.g., Theard v. United States, 354 U.S.
278 (1957); Spanos v. Skouras Theater Corp., 364 F.2d 161 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385
U.S. 987 (1966); Sanders v. Russel, 401 F.2d 241 (5th Cir. 1968); Sobol v. Perez, 289
F. Supp. 392 (E.D. La. 1968). Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (1970). But compare Spanos with In
re Roel, 2 N.Y.2d 224, 144 N.E.2d 24, 165 N.Y.S.2d 81 (1957), appeal dismissed, 355
U.S. 604 (1958).
71. Compare the simple residency requirements for Senators and Representatives.
U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 2, 3.
72. Several courts have found this justification "parochial." See, e.g., Keenan v.
Board of Law Examiners, 317 F. Supp. 1350, 1359 (E.D.N.C. 1970). But cf. U.S. S. CT.
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a community may have more confidence in a stable, local bar.73 A
simple residency requirement bears a rational relationship, or in-
deed, a "fair and substantial relationship," to all of these permissible
goals.
Durational residency requirements promote these purposes, but
their durational aspect needs further justification. One consideration
is that by residing in the state for the required period of time the
applicant will absorb knowledge of the state's governmental struc-
ture and customs. But any knowledge of local customs or of state and
local governmental structure can be tested in bar examinations. 4 An-
other justification is that by meeting a long durational residency
requirement an applicant demonstrates his bona fide intention to
become a permanent resident of the community. It can be argued,
however, that "[i]n our highly mobile society, one who has lived in
a particular locale for one year may be firmly rooted in the com-
munity or he may be ready to move tomorrow." 75 But the issue is
one of probability; an individual who has lived for some time in a
community may be more likely to stay than one who has not. Thus,
this ground has some, but not overwhelming, merit.
A more serious justification is that the residency period gives the
community an opportunity to observe the applicant's moral character,
thus facilitating the state agency's evaluation of his qualifications.76
Critics claim that a durational period is not an effective aid in
assessing character.7 7 They point to the nationwide investigatory
service operated by the National Conference of Bar Examiners as an
alternative.78 However, because the state examining committee is
R. 5(1): "It shall be requisite to the admission of attorneys or counsellors to practice
in this court, that they shall have been such for three years past in the highest
court of a state .... "
73. Several studies have suggested that confidence in the bar and, concomitantly,
in the legal process itself, rests on a continuing relationship between the community
and its legal establishment. See Missouai BAR AssOCIATION, A MOTIVATIONAL STUDY OF
PUBLIC ATrrruDEs AND LAW OFCE MANAGEMENT (1963): IowA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION,
LAY OPINION OF IOWA LAWYERs (1949). Moreover, although in extreme cases formal
disciplinary proceedings, malpractice suits, and other actions can be brought against
nonresident attorneys, see Note, Interstate and Federal Practice, 80 HARV. L. REV.
1711, 1714-15 (1967), the practical considerations of out-of-state litigation make these
remedies unattractive to aggrieved clients.
74. See Lipman v. Van Zant, 329 F. Supp. 391, 400 (N.]). Miss. 1971); Keenan v.
Board of Law Examiners, 317 F. Supp. 1350, 1359 (E.D.N.C. 1970).
75. See Keenan v. Board of Law Examiners, 317 F. Supp. 1350, 1359 (E.D.N.C.
1970).
76. See, e.g., Suffling v. Bondurant, 339 F. Supp. 257, 259 (D.N.M. 1972), affd. mem.
sub nom. Rose v. Bondurant, 41 U.SJ-W. 3287 (U.S., Nov. 21, 1972).
77. The two most common objections are that a durational residency requirement
results in observation during an unfavorable period of forced idleness and that in an
urban society any observation at all is unlikely. See, e.g., Keenan v. Board of Bar
Examiners, 317 F. Supp. 1350, 1359-60 (E.D.N.C. 1970); Horack, supra note 13, at 103.




ultimately responsible for the proper conduct of the investigation, it
may have more confidence in its own officials, procedures, and stan-
dards. More importantly, the state may believe that a six-month
period of residence results in a necessary period of observation,
especially with respect to smaller communities.7 9 Such a requirement
for the purpose of assessing the quality and integrity of applicants
is reasonable, providing the period of observation is not of an exces-
sive length. This last justification alone meets the traditional equal
protection standard. Under the "fair and substantial" version of the
traditional standard, however, the validity of a longer durational
residency requirement, such as twelve months, is doubtful5 0
Assuming that the traditional standard of review is not used,
can either simple residency or durational residency requirements
withstand the strict standard of equal protection review? It seems
possible that a state's interest in the integrity of its bar is a compel-
ling one.8' Simple residency requirements further that interest by
vesting legal institutions with the most direct and effective means
available of ensuring that the bar is disciplined, that lawyers have a
stake in the community and are familiar with local customs and
practices, and that community confidence in a stable, local bar is
79. The investigating committees are local in nature, often covering only one
county. See, e.g., Green, Procedures for Character Investigations, 55 BAR EXAmiNER 10, 11
(1966).
80. See note 68 supra and accompanying text.
81. Lower courts have indicated that this is a compelling interest. See, e.g.,
Suffiing v. Bondurant, 359 F. Supp. 257, 260 (D.N.M. 1972), affd. mere. sub nom.
Rose v. Bondurant, 41 U.S.L.W. 3287 (U.S., Nov. 21, 1972) (dictum); Keenan v. Board
of Law Examiners, 317 F. Supp. 1350, 1361 (1970) (dictum); In re Griffiths, - Conn.
-, -, 294 A.2d 281, 287, prob. furis. noted, 406 U.S. 966 (1972); In re Titus, - Va.
-, 191 S.E.2d 798, 802-05 (1972) (dictum). Cf. Krzewinski v. Kugler, 538 F. Supp.
492, 498-501 (D.N.J. 1972) (upholding a residency requirement for firemen); Hadnott
v. Amos, 320 F. Supp. 107, 119-23 (M.D. Ala. 1970), affd. mem., 405 U.S. 1035 (1972)
(one year of residence required before eligible for state circuit judgeship).
The first Supreme Court case that possibly justified strictly scrutinized governmental
action by a finding of a compelling interest was Korematsu v. United States, 325
U.S. 214 (1944). In that case national security provided a compelling federal interest.
One case decided after the advent of "two-tiered" equal protection, Abate v. Mundt,
403 U.S. 182, 185-87 (1970), may also have rested on the finding of such state interest
in an apportionment plan that attempted to preserve a county-district overlap of
elected officials. It was in this barren setting that Chief Justice Burger remarked:
To challenge such [standards] by the "compelling state interest" standard is to
condemn them all. So far as I am aware, no state law has satisfied this seemingly
insurmountable standard, and I doubt one ever will, for it demands nothing less
than perfection.
Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 350, 565-64 (1972) (dissenting opinion). It is interesting
to note that two dicta in the Dunn majority opinion indicated that Tennessee may
have had compelling interests in a simple residency and thirty-day durational voting
requirement. 405 U.S. at 343-44, 347-49. See also Marston v. Lewis, 41 U.S.L.W. 5498
(U.S., March 19, 1973) (upholding fifty-day durational requirement for voting). Sub-
sequent to Dunn there has been an explicit finding of a compelling state interest in
Roe v. Wade, 41 U.S.L.W. 4213 (U.S., Jan. 22, 1973). The state's interest in the life of a
mother becomes "compelling" after three months of pregnancy, and its interest in the
fetus becomes "compelling" at viability. 41 U.S.L.W. at 4228.
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maintained. But because a simple residency requirement will pre-
vent some otherwise qualified individuals from practicing within
the state and will at the same time allow some unqualified individ-
uals to practice, a rigid application of the strict test might invalidate
the requirement.
Durational requirements would more surely be invalid under a
literal application of the strict standard. The use of a durational
requirement to screen applicants for the likelihood of becoming
permanent residents and as an aid in character investigations lacks
surgical precision. These requirements are both over- and under-
inclusive, and a less onerous means, although one perhaps not as
acceptable to the state, is available through the national investigatory
service. 12 As noted above, however, it would not be unreasonable to
draw a line with respect to the degree of penalization of the constitu-
tional right to travel, subjecting lengthy durational residency require-
ments to strict scrutiny while leaving simple residency and shorter
durational residency requirements subject to the traditional test.
In addition to the traditional and strict equal protection stan-
dards, there is a third alternative by which to judge these bar admis-
sions requirements. A finding that simple or durational residency
requirements penalize travel sufficiently to make the application of
the traditional test, with its broad leeway, inappropriate, does not
logically require the application of a wooden, inflexible test. In an
area where some degree of penalization or deterrence of travel will
result from any bar admissions requirement an unyielding test
should have no place. In an area historically and constitutionally one
of state authority some deference should come to bear. Indeed, the
Supreme Court has appeared to approach all bar admissions problems
with some trepidation8 3
This deference may come to bear at various points in an equal
protection analysis. The strict test may not be applied at all, solely
because of the state's interest;84 possibly a more stringent traditional
test would be used. 5 If a compelling interest standard is used, a court
could still require the involvement of a vital state interest but might
allow some leeway as to the precision of the means used.80 But these
82. But see Suflling v. Bondurant, 339 F. Supp. 257, 260 (D.N.M. 1972), affd. mem.
sub nom. Rose v. Bondurant, 41 U.S.L.W. 3287 (U.S., Nov. 21, 1972). It appears that the
three-judge court would have upheld the six-month durational residency requirement
even under the strict test.
83. See notes 16-27 supra and accompanying text.
84. Suffling v. Bondurant, 339 F. Supp. 257, 259 (D.N.M. 1972), affd. mer. sub
nom. Rose v. Bondurant, 41 U.S.L.W. 3287 (U.S., Nov. 21, 1972).
85. See notes 43-44 supra and accompanying text.
86. When formulating durational residency requirements the states' concern is
with the character of their applicants. Since the whole process of character evaluation,
by its nature, is not amenable to precise methodology, states should be allowed leeway




approaches, as a practical matter, indicate that a straightforward
balancing test, suggested by recent Court decisions, is an ideal
analytical framework.87 If travel is sufficiently penalized by a require-
ment, this means almost certain death under the strict standard
despite the requirement's merits. Under a comparative approach the
state's interest could still be given appropriate weight.88 The judg-
ment of the state courts in their formulation of bar standards could
be considered and the extent of penalization compared. Both simple
residency and short durational requirements would fare well under
such an analysis.
87. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 41 U.S.L.W. 4213, 4224, 4229 (U.S., Jan. 22, 1973); Police
Dept. v. Mosely, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164,
172-73 (1972); San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 41 U.S.L.W. 4407,
4437-41 (U.S., March 21, 1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Rosario v. Rockefeller, 41
U.S.L.W. 4401, 4406 (U.S., March 21, 1973) (Powell, J., dissenting); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S.
319, 325-26 (1972) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See also Aguayo v. Richardson, Nos. 72-2195,
72-2243, slip op. at 1588-90 (2d Cir., Jan. 18, 1973) (Friendly, C.J.). See generally Gunther,
supra note 43; Comment, The Decline and Fall of the New Equal Protection: A Polem-
ical Approach, 58 VA. L. REV. 1489 (1972).
In dealing with infringements upon the right to interstate travel the high court
has had advocates of a balancing approach. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S.
330, 362-63 (1972) (Blackmun, J., concurring); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 671
(1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting); 394 U.S. at 650 (Warren, C.J., dissenting). Justice
Marshall, in the majority opinion in Dunn, stated that although the test "may sound
like a mathematical formula," the "key words emphasize a matter of degree." 405 U.S.
at 342-43. Cf. 405 U.S. at 335. Compare the due process analysis in the international
travel cases. E.g., Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964); Kent v. Dulles,
357 U.S. 116 (1958).
88. Justice Holmes has pointed out:
All rights tend to declare themselves absolute to their logical extreme. Yet all in
fact are limited by the neighborhood of principles of policy which are other than
those on which the particular right is founded, and which become strong enough
to hold their own when a certain point is reached.
Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 355 (1908).
